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Abstract
Without assuming any pdf for some measured parameter, we derive a predictive pdf for
the outcome of a second measurement, given the outcome of the first measurement and two
common assumptions about the noise. These are that (1) it is additive, and (2) it is of some
known pdf . The argument is based on a Bayesian analysis of the noise when no pdf is
provided for the value of the parameter. In this way we avoid assuming an ad-hoc prior.
We clarify how this method of direct predictive inference is distinct from fiducial prediction.
We specify the distinct flaw in the fiducial argument, and outline the importance of this
development in the foundations of probability and statistics.
Keywords: nonparametric predictive inference, direct pivotal argument, pivotal argu-
ment, fiducial argument, fiducial prediction, Bayesian inference, reference prior, reference
class.
1 Outline and Motivation
We examine the problem of deriving a pdf predicting a future outcome x2 based on an earlier outcome
x1 and a model of location measurements,
1 when there is no prior pdf . We consider the solution based on
the distribution of x2−x1, which is readily determined. In this way we avoid assuming some “reference
prior” (e.g. [1]). We also dodge the problematic premises of fiducial prediction ([2], [3]; reviewed in [4]);
that is, we can do without parametric inference, unlike in the Bayesian and fiducial treatments.
The intuitive appeal of the “direct” pivotal argument (the term is borrowed from [4], p. 365) is bal-
anced by an understandable skepticism toward pivotal inference because an argument of this kind has
also been advanced by Fisher in support of fiducial inference (e.g. [3]). This generated much controversy
in its day and is generally regarded as problematic at best ([5], [4], [6], [7] — even by Fisher himself, in
private communication with Barnard and Savage, cited in [6], p. 381).
In this setting we have a double task. In the first place we have to account for selectively dismissing
fiducial inference but not the pivotal argument of direct predictive inference. We focus on a technical
shortcoming specific to the fiducial argument, in Sec. 2.2.3. This observation is interesting in itself,
because it complements earlier critical reviews of the fiducial argument, like [5], [4], and [6]. On the
other hand, to address certain well-founded concerns, we submit a mathematical demonstration (starting
at Sec. 2.2.4) that the pivotal pdf in the direct pivotal argument is unaffected by our knowing x1.
Doing so, we justify solutions to common practical problems, without resorting to “statistical prin-
ciples” and makeshift priors. This treatment also introduces an important theoretical development, be-
cause until now the fiducial argument has posed a profound quandary: it has already been shown that
it leads to contradiction (see [4], Sec. 5) but, inasmuch as no specific step in the fiducial argument has
been identified as being wrong, the foundation of probability theory (not only statistics) is implicated, by
default. In the aftermath, a tacit stopgap injuction has been generally in effect, to avoid fiducial infer-
ence, as it were with the force of an ad-hoc modification of the axioms of probability. In consequence,
the process of deduction has been undermined, because new axioms have not been explicitly stated, and,
even if they had, any modified foundation would seem contrived in comparison to the classical one. (This
is most evident in the case of the “direct” pivotal argument, which is similar to fiducial inference yet is
distinct from it, so that it is unclear whether the informal injunction applies.) The present treatment
dissolves this predicament, by isolating the distinct flaw in the fiducial argument, and so restoring the
classical foundation in the theory of probability.
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1 ‘Location’ means that the noise is additive and its pdf does not depend on the measured magnitude.
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2 The main argument
2.1 Fundamental issues related to predictive inference
To use a plain example, let θ be an unknown real constant, not the result of any known random pro-
cess. Two independent measurements of θ, with outcomes x1 and x2, correspond to conditional random
variables X
1 {θ=t} and X2 {θ=t}. We assume that, conditionally on any possible value of θ, these are
independent and distributed normally: X
1 {θ=t} ∼N(t, σ
2
1
) andX
2 {θ=t} ∼N(t, σ
2
2
), where σ1 and
σ2 are assumed constant and known. The difference of the two outcomes, d ≡ x2−x1, corresponds to
X
2 {θ=t}−X1 {θ=t}, which is distributed normally with mean 0 and variance σ
2
1
+σ 2
2
, without refer-
ence to the value of θ. Therefore random variableD can be defined, followingN(0,σ 2
1
+σ 2
2
), and is not
conditional on θ. Any random variable with this property is called pivotal or a pivot.
The pdf of D can be directly applied to generate the pdf for “x2, given x1” according to what has
been called “direct” pivotal argument (as distinct from fiducial prediction) in [4] (p. 365). But this is not
the end of the issue, because this argument relies on the premise that the pdf of D{x1=s}
is the same
as the pdf ofD. To defend this claim, it is not enough to know that the distribution ofD is independent
of θ; one must also demonstrate that knowledge of x1 does not make any difference (that is, x1 by itself
does not specify any recognizable subset of the reference class (or “reference set”) associated withD (e.g.
[3] pp. 57-58, [5], or [4])).
The problem has persisted for decades, because, lacking a mathematical demonstration of this claim
([5] Sec. 4; [6] Sec. 7.2), conjectures about the post-data pdf of a pivot have been presumed by some
authors on the basis of an intuitive conviction, starting with Fisher (e.g., see [6] Sec. 7.2), who has evoked
a general version of this assertion in support of his fiducial argument. The inadequacy of a bare appeal
to intuition has been outstanding since Fisher’s assertion was checked wrong in a particular situation [8]
which involves the t-distribution (for an outline see [4] p. 364).
Nevertheless this finding does not extend to our example. Moreover, in this work we submit a proof
backing the claim that, in the case of location measurements, x1 is irrelevant (by itself) to the pdf ofD.
2.2 General considerations
2.2.1 Additive noise as a pivotal random variable
Each location measurement (here we label them by i = 1, 2, ...) can be thought of as involving a ran-
dom process, generating noise Ei of a known pdf fi(ei), which is then added to the unknown parameter
θ to provide an outcome xi. Our assignment of a pre-data pdf to Ei is based on this assumption, which
we call Assumption Bi, or simply Bi.
We shall employ a detailed notation for probability statements, to display the defining assumptions
(the “context” or ”reference class”) which label the corresponding probability space. For instance, to state
explicitly that the pre-data pdf of E1 does not depend on (hypothetical values of) θ, we write
(∀ t) PrE1
(e1|B1, “θ=t”) ≡ PrE1
(e1|B1) ≡ f1(e1) . (1)
(That is, E1 is a pivot.)
The suffix in a probability statement has a double role. Not only it denotes the random variable
(here: E1) which is associated with the indicated value (here: e1), but also, when the random variable
is continuous, it specifies the parametrisation used to represent the probability density function as a
regular function.
In the following we shall focus on determining the post-data pdf of the error of measurement. This
pdf can be expressed as PrE1
(e1|B1, “x1=s”).
2.2.2 Disregarding the true value of the parameter
In the expression PrE1
(e1|B1, “x1=s”), the reference class is specified by two conditions: an as-
sumption regarding the noise of this type of measurement, and an acceptance of the outcome of this
2
particular measurement.
As a technical excercise, if in the specification of the reference class we also included the hypotheti-
cal “true value of θ”, as in PrE1
(e1|B1, “x1=s”, “θ=t”), the pdf would collapse into the delta-function
δ(e1−s+t), which is unspecified, therefore useless for predictive inference (besides, it does not contain
any trace of the known properties of the measurement).
However, the general issue of selecting the reference class is still open; at any rate, it cannot be
decided within the theory of probability. We cannot prove that it is wrong to include “θ=t” in the spec-
ification of the reference class. We rather point out some counterintuitive consequences of this choice,
ultimately related to practical disadvantages.
A simple version of the same problem will arise if one tosses a fair coin, and immediately covers it
with a bowl. Do we accept that the reference class consists of all such trials (disregarding that either
‘heads’ or ‘tails’ has already become a constituent of reality) so that probability of heads-under-the-bowl
is 0.5, or do we restrict the refererence class to this single case, so that probability cannot be defined
(except trivially)? With the first option, we stand to gain (in the long run) from betting against someone
who wrongly believes that probability of heads-under-the-bowl is 0.6. Not so if we follow the second
option.
The same problem arises in any application of Bayes’ theorem, even if it is based on well-defined prior
probability. Take for instance the interpretation of a medical diagnostic test, such as an HIV-antibody
test. The lab procedure outputs the relative likelihood of infection, which then can be combined with
prior probability based on information about the subject’s lifestyle, using statistical tables, to derive the
posterior probability of HIV infection. This analysis assumes that the reference class is the set of people
with the same lifestyle. On the other hand, if one refuses to relax the consideration that the particular
subject is either already infected or not infected, the probability of HIV infection cannot be defined (except
trivially, that is, “either 0 or 1”).
In view of these consequences of our options, we elect to include (or imply) the clause “disregarding
the true value of θ” in the interpretation of a pivotal random variable, after the outcome is known, so that
we prevent the collapse into a trivial reference class. A deliberate omission of this clause would amount
to voiding the pdf of E1 {x1=s}
.
2.2.3 The impossibility of a fiducial argument
Fisher has emphasised repeatedly that the fiducial assignment of a pdf to the parameter requires a
carefully considered specification of the reference class. (He uses the terms ‘aggregate’, ‘population’, and
‘reference set’, as cited in [6].) However, when we follow this advice, we find that the fiducial argument is
not sustainable.
Suppose (for the moment) that we have established the assignment of a pdf to E
1 {x1=s}
; we are
not thereby justified to pair it with a corresponding pdf for θ, because it would conflict with the clause
“disregarding the true value of θ” which is implied in the specification of the reference class. A striking
incongruity looms in the sentence “the probability of θ being between t1 and t2, disregarding the value
of θ, is 0.95”.
Here we divorce direct predictive inference from the fiducial argument, in terms of logical connection,
yet it can be said that the two schemes are related in intention. In the words of A.P. Dempster [9],
“fiducial probabilities are intended for post-data predictive interpretation”. Also F. Hampel [10] focuses
on the predictive role of fiducial probabilities. We outline Fisher’s position in Sec. 3.
2.2.4 Determination of post-data probability for additive noise
In relation to the issue “what is the pdf of E
1 {x1=s}
”, one may also ask “how is this pdf updated
if, on the next day, we learn that θ had been a random outcome of some process, with pdf pi(θ)”. The
idea is that Bayesian updating applies in this case, as if the object of the measurement were the value of
the noise, e1, and the direct information about θ were only part of the measurement process.
2 The pdf
2 In the words of Jaynes: “But a telescope maker might see it differently. For him, the errors it
produces are the objects of interest to study, and a star is only a convenient fixed object on which to
3
of E
1 {x1=s}
will be identified with the prior of the alternate Bayesian treatment (since it is meant to
apply when we lack any direct information about θ).
To present this argument clearly, let us denote byH the assumption that θ is the result of a random
process, corresponding to a random variable Θ, of pdf pi(θ). IfH is accepted, then use of Bayes’ theorem
is justified for probability update, assuming an outcome x1.
In our case we also have the assumption of a location measurement. It is expressed in Eq. 1, which
states the requirement that the pre-measurement pdf of the noise (E1) be independent of [any hypothet-
ical value that might be supposed of] θ. Note that the converse property is also true, trivially:
(∀ e) PrΘ(θ|H, “e1=e”) ≡ PrΘ(θ|H) ≡ pi(θ) . (2)
That is, the prior pdf associated with θ is independent of [any hypothetical magnitude that might be
supposed of] the error of this measurement.
Note the formal symmetry between (θ,H) and (e1,B1), by comparing Eq. 1 with Eq. 2.
3 Therefore
there are two Bayesian ways of derivingPrE1
(e|B1,H, “x1=s”). As a consistency check, let us compare
the results of the two corresponding treatments.
A. The usual Bayesian treatment
In the usual treatment we first update the pdf of Θ, from pi(θ) to the corresponding posterior pdf .
We apply the familiar Bayesian formula
posterior pdf = prior pdf × likelihood × normalising constant.
The likelihood function for θ, given “x1=s”, is defined up to an unimportant factor:
L
θ {x1=s}
(t) ∝ PrX1
(s|B1, “θ=t”) . (3)
Considering the transformation fromX
1 {θ=t} toE1 {θ=t} ≡X1 {θ=t}−t, of Jacobian determinant 1,
we obtain
PrX1
(s|B1, “θ=t”) ≡ PrE1
(s−t|B1, “θ=t”) . (4)
From Eq.s 3, 4, and 1, we obtain
L
θ {x1=s}
(t) ∝ f1(s−t) . (5)
Note that the definition of the likelihood function does not involveH. (That is, with a different prior pdf
for θ, or in default of any prior pdf , the likelihood function would be the same.)
The posterior pdf of Θ is4
PrΘ(t|H,B1, “x1=s”) ∝ Lθ {x1=s}
(t) pi(t) ∝ f1(s−t) pi(t) .
focus his instrument for the purpose of determining those errors. Thus a given data set might serve
two entirely different purposes; one man’s ‘noise’ is another man’s ‘signal’ ” [11] Ch. 7. (Also in Ch. 8 he
observes the mathematical “reciprocity” between random variableΘ and any ancillary random variable.)
3 This symmetry may be clouded because of certain properties that typically are desired for f1(e1)
without being required of it: we prefer that it average to zero, and that it also be symmetrical about
zero; moreover, it is convenient that it follow the normal distribution. However, these properties being
nonessential, there is no real issue here. Besides, when we want to perform a direct zero calibration of
the apparatus, we usually select a pi(θ) having the above properties.
4 Strictly speaking, if f1(·) is smooth, Bayesian updating cannot be based on the acceptance of “x1=
s” because the probability of that occurence is zero for all values of θ. Instead of an exact value for x1,
we consider some small interval including that value. In the first-order approximation we reckon the
(conditional on θ) probability of this interval as the product PrX1
(s|B1,“θ=t”)× ∆x1. Therefore if the
interval is small enoughwe apply the likelihood function defined in Eq. 3 as the first-order approximation.
In fact it is never possible to record x1 exactly; it is always registered as a digitised entry, which is
equivalent to some interval.
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Now we take advantage of the transformation fromΘ to E1 which is defined byE1 ≡ s−Θ, of Jacobian
determinant 1, to derive
PrE1
(e|B1,H, “x1=s”) ≡ PrΘ(s−e|B1,H, “x1=s”) ∝ f1(e) pi(s−e) . (6)
B. The “instrument maker’s” Bayesian treatment
In the alternate Bayesian treatment we update the pdf of E1, from f1(e1) to the corresponding
posterior pdf . Again we make use of a likelihood function but now it is the likelihood function for e1,
given “x1= s”. In analogy with the previous treatment, we define the likelihood function for e1, given
“x1=s”, without reference to B1:
L
e1 {x1=s}
(e) ∝ PrX1
(s|H, “e1=e”)
Considering the transformation fromX1 {e1=e}
to Θ ≡X1 {e1=e}
−e, we obtain
PrX1
(s|H, “e1=e”) ≡ PrΘ(s−e|H, “e1=e”) ≡ pi(s−e)
(in the second step we have taken into account Eq. 2) so that the likelihood function is
L
e1 {x1=s}
(e) ∝ pi(s−e)
Now we can derive the posterior pdf of E1, up to a normalisation factor:
PrE1
(e|B1,H, “x1=s”) ∝ Le1 {x1=s}
(e) f1(e) ∝ pi(s−e) f1(e) . (7)
As expected, Eq. 7 is equivalent with Eq. 6, so that the “instrument maker’s” version of Bayesian
updating is checked as accurate. The important point is, the prior pdf in this procedure, which is meant
to apply as long as no direct information about θ is (yet) available, is just f1(e1) .
5 In other words, we
have determined the pdf of E
1 {x1=s}
, and it turns out the same as the pre-measurement pdf of E1.
We have shown that x1 does not specify any recognizable subset of the reference class that is indicated
by the clause “disregarding the unknown value of the parameter”, with regard to random variable E1.
2.2.5 Justification of the direct pivotal argument
A corollary of the irrelevance of x1 to the pdf of E1 is that x1 is also irrelevant to the pdf of D
(defined in Sec. 2.1). This is due to the identities
d ≡ x2−x1 ≡ e2−e1 ,
so that
D ≡ E2−E1 .
We have already seen that the pdf of E1 is unaffected by our knowing x1, and of course so is the pdf of
E2. Consequently, so is the pdf ofD. In notation,
PrD(d|B1,B2, “x1=s”) ≡ PrD(d|B1,B2) (8)
We have solved the problem stated in Sec. 2.1, regarding the post-measurement pdf ofD. In this way
we have provided the foundation for the direct pivotal argument, so that we can produce the pdf for “x2
given x1, disregarding the unknown value of θ”.
5 If there is any doubt whether the pdf for the error is legitimate when we do not know of any pdf for
θ, let us refer to the symmetrical situation, when we admit a prior pdf for the parameter regardless of
the properties of the measuring apparatus, even regardless of whether there will be any measurement at
all.
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To obtain a concrete result, note that the pdf ofD is the marginal pdf of E2−E1 for any value of θ,
PrD(d|B1,B2) ≡
∫
d ξ f1(ξ) f2(d+ξ) (9)
where ξ is a dummy variable. Considering the transformation fromD{x1=s}
toX2 {x1=s}
, we conclude
that
PrX2
(x2|B1,B2, “x1=s”) ≡
∫
d ξ f1(ξ) f2(x2−s+ξ) . (10)
This result is based on disregarding the true value of the parameter. By coincidence, fiducial predic-
tion also results to the same pdf , which also coincides with the predictive pdf based on a uniform prior
density for the parameter.
3 Discussion
Although the “direct” pivotal argument applies only with location measurements (a special case, even
if not too uncommon) the importance of this analysis lies in showing an example of non-parametric pre-
dictive inference based on parametric models.
In another paper we shall extend this result in two ways: the predicted outcome need not be related
to a location measurement, and the prediction may be based on any number of location measurements.
However modest those developments appear in relation to the general case, the issues raised by them
require careful treatment, so that they cannot be addressed in a short paper like the present one.
Here is a note regarding the distinction between direct and fiducial prediction. Fisher has not over-
looked that the problem of fiducial predictive inference based on datum x1 can be solved “directly”, that
is, not only “after the [...] distribution of the population parameter[...] has been obtained” ([2], Sec. II);
in other words: “without discussing the possible values of the parameter θ” ([3], Sec. V.3). Yet he defines
fiducial prediction as derived from fiducial probability of the parameter values; consequently the simpli-
fication he mentions is only a secondary issue. In the present work predictive inference is defined in the
absence of any distribution for θ, therefore the possibility to also calculate it as if from some intuitive
density function of the parameter is fortuitous, proved in the case of location measurements but not yet
guaranteed to be generally true.
4 Conclusions
The error (or “noise”) of a location measurement corresponds to a pivotal random variable. There is
an issue regarding what is the appropriate reference class for interpreting this random variable after the
outcome is known. We show that, if we want a non-trivial and a practically useful result, the reference
class must be specified by the clause “disregarding the unknown value of the parameter”. In this way we
also preserve correspondence with the common usage of the term ‘probability’. This clause prevents the
application of the fiducial argument, so that no pdf for the parameter may be justified; fiducial prediction
is also voided by this clause. However, the direct pivotal argument remains valid. It solves the problem
of predictive inference, for location measurements, without any intermediate parametric inferece. In this
way we have attained “pure” predictive inference; that is, not involving any inductive component; every
step involves deduction only.
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